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I
INTRODUCTION

The problem that has most vexed judicial decisionmakers and academic
writers about constitutional equality guarantees is how to measure equality in
deciding when equality rights have been violated. This article suggests that
an analysis in three dimensions provides valuable direction toward a solution.
In its early decisions under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms,' the Supreme Court of Canada has addressed equality in a
ground-breaking and creative way. 2 At the core of its approach to equality
rights in these decisions is the kind of simple yet profound insight that the
concept of "equity" exemplifies in the law of remedies. The insightembodied in what I refer to as the "equality principle"-is that equality rights
are constitutionally guaranteed in order to counterbalance certain types of
inequalities between people. They are not primarily designed to address
"inequality" in a generic or abstract sense.3 The wording and context of the
Canadian constitutional equality guarantees determine the kinds of
inequalities that must be addressed and the possible ways of addressing them.
The equality rights are aimed at the alleviation of particular disadvantages,
such as those between women and men, racial or religious minorities and the
dominant group, persons with handicapping conditions and those of average
abilities, the elderly or the very young and the rest of the population, and
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1. Can Const (Constitution Act, 1982) pt I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
2. Three cases, taken together, state the Supreme Court's views about the scope and
application of § 15, the main equality rights guarantee in the Charter: Andrews v Law Society of British
Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 (holding that a citizenship requirement for entry into the British
Columbia bar violates § 15); R. v Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR 1296 (upholding certain provisions of the
Criminal Code that allow residents of Alberta to choose a trial by judge alone and deny the same
choice to residents of the other provinces); Reference Re W4orkers'CompensationAct, 1983 (Newfoundland),
[1989] 1 SCR 922 (dismissing a claim that workers' compensation legislation precluding court action
by persons covered by the Act was contrary to § 15). See also the discussion of these cases in notes
42 and 56.
3. Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR at 163-64 (McIntyre dissenting).
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other analogous situations. This insight leads to an overarching equality
principle that solves some vexing problems with the application of equality
guarantees. The equality principle has this capacity because it adds a third
dimension to a previously two-dimensional approach. The thesis of this
article is that the approach initiated by the Canadian Supreme Court in 1989,
which will be discussed below, should be maintained and is worthy of
4
consideration by other courts in appropriate circumstances.
Part II begins with a brief discussion of the traditional problems with
"equality" and why they are so vexing, then follows with a description of the
Canadian Supreme Court's innovative solution, and concludes with a
discussion of the implications of that solution. After speculation about why
the Canadian Supreme Court took such a different course from the United
States Supreme Court in its equal protection jurisprudence, this article
elaborates an argument in favour of the Canadian approach. Part III focuses
this argument on the particular issue of sex inequality.
II
VEXING PROBLEMS IN

A.

Two

DIMENSIONS

A Description of the Problems

A simple guarantee of "equality" in effect guarantees nothing. In this
respect it differs from other constitutional guarantees, even those that also are
broad and amorphous (like "freedom of expression"). The classic
Aristotelian statement of the equality principle, "things that are alike should
be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in
proportion to their unlikeness," 5 is tautologous

6

(that is, it is always and

necessarily true, and from it any other proposition can be derived). Being
tautologous, it cannot provide a test for equality. Rather, it provides the
equivalent of a mathematical formula, such as "X plus Y equals Y plus X."
Such a formula is useful, but only when the variables that will be used have
been determined. In the case of the equality principle, the variables are the
people who will be counted as alike or unalike, and the treatment that will be
considered alike or unalike. Determination of the variables is therefore
dispositive of the outcome. And since the formal equality principle provides
4. While two recent cases from the Supreme Court of Canada could be seen as precursors to an
abandonment of this approach, they are explicable in other ways. See McKinney v University of Guelph,
[1990] 3 SCR 229 (upholding mandatory retirement in a university setting and the exclusion of
persons over the age of 65 from protection against age discrimination in provincial human rights
legislation); R. v Hess; R. v Nguyen, [1990] 2 SCR 906 (combined on appeal) (upholding against § 15
challenges a statute making it an offence for males to have sexual intercourse with females under the
age of 14). These cases are discussed further at notes 43 and 81, respectively.
5. Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR at 166.
6. For elaboration of this point, see Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv I. Rev
537, 544-48 (1982).
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no assistance in identifying the variables, it provides no solutions to the
problems .7

Even when the elaboration on the equality principle by Joseph Tussman
and Jacobus tenBroek8 has been added (so that the variables are to be
identified in the light of the purpose of the legislation or measure under
attack), the solution to the great majority of problems remains indeterminate.
The elaborated principle may be referred to as the "similarly situated test,"
and its weaknesses are serious. 9 First, it rarely provides an answer in a specific
case. Instead, the answer will depend upon conclusions external to the
"test"-in particular, conclusions about which comparisons to make, about
the degree of similarity or difference between the persons being compared,
and about the degree of similarity or difference between the treatment they
are afforded. Those conclusions are indeterminate because, when desired, it
is always possible to find either a similarity or a difference. For example,
apples and oranges are both fruits, and a cabbage and a king are both carbonbased organisms. I am unlike my colleague down the hall because she has
taken two sabbatical leaves, while I have taken one. Identical twins are
different because one was born five minutes later than the other and was in an
automobile accident when he was six. Endless examples could be.given, but
the point is clear that similarities and differences are in the eye of the
beholder.
In addition, even when the variables have been determined, that is, the
comparators have been selected and the similarities or differences have been
assigned to the persons and to the treatment, the formal equality principle
does not provide answers to some important questions that Aristotle probably
did not consider. Specifically, what should be done with cases where there are
obvious differences between persons, but those who are identified as
"unalike" resist both the conclusion that the difference warrants worse
treatment and that the equality principle is satisfied by identical treatment that
fails to produce equality of results for them? (It is not wholly immaterial that
the people whom Aristotle would have considered like himself would have
been free men-not slaves, and not women.) As an example, consider cases
involving biological differences between the sexes. Two observations can be
made: (1) the implicit standard for measurement of likeness is the dominant
group (in this case, males); and (2) the "similarly situated test" fails to suggest
what, if any, action should be taken in a given case after a finding of
"unlikeness." That is, unlikeness can be seen as warranting worse treatment,
identical treatment whether or not it produces equality of results, or
7. For elaboration of this point, see Lynn Smith, A New Paradigmfor Equality Rights, in Lynn
Smith, et al, eds, Righting the Balance: Canada's New Equality Rights 351 (Can Human Rts Rptr, 1986).
See also William Black & Lynn Smith, The Equality Rights, in Gerald-A. Beaudoin & Ed Ratushny, eds,
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 557, 562-63 (Carswell, 2d ed 1989) ("The Equality Rights").
8. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of Laws, 37 Cal L Rev 341, 346
(1949) ("A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with
respect to the purpose of the law.").
9. See Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR at 165-68.
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differential treatment designed to produce such equality. In both the United
States and Canada, cases involving pregnant women in the workforce
illustrate this point. ' 0 Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General), the Canadian Supreme
Court case, has been overruled," but its reasoning illustrates the
indeterminacy of the "similarly situated test." During a certain stage of
pregnancy and delivery, women were made ineligible for standard
unemployment insurance benefits, whether or not they were ready, willing,
and able to work. The Canadian Supreme Court held, in a challenge based
upon the "equality before the law" guarantee in the Canadian Bill of Rights, 12
that the inequality was created by "nature," not the statute, and that all nonpregnant persons (male or female) were treated alike, as were all pregnant
persons. The "similarly situated test," though it did not demand this result,
nevertheless was satisfied by it.
If measurement of equality in terms of similarities and differences can be
characterized as two-dimensional, then equality problems involving a third
dimension will often not be understandable, let alone soluble.' 3 Recognition
of social subordination or hierarchy can be seen as adding the equivalent of a
third dimension to the perception of the problem.' 4 The well-known contrast
between the majority decisions in Plessy v. Ferguson15 and Brown v. Board of
Education 16 is a case in point. Whether disingenuously or not, the majority in
Plessy failed to recognize the problem with "separate but equal" facilities. The
problem became visible in Brown when the Court recognized the overall social
subordination of which the "separate but equal" school systems formed a
part.
B.

The Supreme Court of Canada's Innovative Solution

To explain why the Canadian Supreme Court's approach is innovative,
some discussion of the U.S. jurisprudence is warranted, not only because of
10. See General Electric Co. v Gilbert, 429 US 125 (1976); Geduldig v Aiello, 417 US 484 (1974); Bliss
v Canada (Attorney General), [1979] 1 SCR 183 (all three of which upheld measures denying
employment benefits to pregnant women.)
11. Brooks v Canada Safeway Lid, [1989] 1 SCR 1219.
12. Revised Stat Can (RSC) 1985, App III, § 1(b) (1960). The Canadian Bill of Rights, which is
still in effect, is a federal statute of quasi-constitutional status. It came into effect in 1960 and
contained the only general guarantees of rights and freedoms permitting review of federal legislation
until the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect in 1982.
13. For a parable about the difficulties in understanding a three-dimensional world when seen in
two dimensions, see Edwin A. Abbott, Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions (Dover Publications,
6th ed, revised 1952).
14. Note that it was not the particular notion of "separate but equal" that was necessarily
problematic, but the role that it played in the social subordination of African-Americans. A strong
argument can be made, for example, in favour of facilities for women where women want and need
them and where such facilities assist in alleviating their social subordination. See, for example, Tomen
9

9

v F. I' TA.O., 61 DLR (4th) 565 (Ont Ct App 1 8 )(concerning a teachers' association for women

only).
15.
16.

163 US 537 (1896).
347 US 483 (1954).
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the context in which this article is published, but because that standard of
7
comparison is often implicit in Canadian discussion.'
As the Brown 18 case shows, the recognition of social subordination is not
new. In fact, it seems to form an important part of U.S. equal protection
jurisprudence, which effectively began with the Carolene Products footnote.' 9
While recognition seems clearer in cases involving race (reflecting the fact
that the paradigmatic case for the equal protection clause has been race
discrimination 2 0 ), it is also possible to find acknowledgement of the realities
of subordination of women to men in some of the sex-based cases under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196421 (for example, the relatively recent
decisions in the Price Waterhouse,22 Meritor,2 3 and California Federal24 cases).

Various U.S. commentators, including Professors Owen Fiss, 2 5 Catharine
MacKinnon, 2 6 Christine Littleton, 2 7 and Sylvia Law, 2 8 have argued for an
approach in which recognition of social subordination or hierarchy would be
explicit and central in determining whether there has been a violation of the
equal protection guarantee. For example, Professor Fiss wrote:
One purpose of this essay is to underscore the fact that the antidiscrimination
principle is not the Equal Protection Clause, that it is nothing more than a mediating
principle. I want to bring to an end the identification of the Clause with the
antidiscrimination principle. But I also have larger ambitions. I want to suggest that
the antidiscrimination principle embodies a very limited conception of equality, one

17. This discussion is made with great diffidence. The author acknowledges that what follows is
the merest sketch of one aspect of a huge and complex body of law.
18. 347 US 483.
19. United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152-53 n4 (1938) (recognizing that
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities ...
may call for a . . . more searching judicial
inquiry").
20. For support of this view, see Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualizationand
Appraisal, 79 Colum L Rev 1023, 1028-32 (1979); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,
in Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel & Thomas Scanlon, eds, Equality and Preferential Treatment
(Princeton U Press, 1977) ("Groups and the Equal Protection Clause"); Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual
Harassment of Working Women: A Case Study of Sex Discrimination 127-28 (Yale U Press, 1979).
21. Codified at 42 USC § 2000e-2 (1988).
22. In Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228 (1989), the Court upheld a finding that Price
Waterhouse had discriminated against Ms. Hopkins on the basis of sex by consciously giving
credence to views that resulted from sex stereotyping in assessing her for partnership. (Under the
rubric of "interpersonal skills," the partners had commented unfavourably on the respondent's
"unfeminine" behaviour. To enhance her chances for partnership, she was advised to "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry." Id at 235.) After that decision, the matter went back to U.S. District Judge Gerhard
Gesell for a determination under a lower standard of proof. He found liability and ordered the firm
to make Hopkins a partner. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the
remedy-full partnership retroactive to 1982, with $371,000 in back pay. Hopkins v Price Waterhouse,
920 F2d 967 (DC Cir 1990). The case may still not be over. See New Title VII Remedy: Price Waterhouse
ordered to admit woman plaintiff to partnership, 77 ABAJ 24 (Feb 1991).
23. Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 US 57 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment is a form of
sex discrimination under Title VII).
24. California FederalSavings & Loan v Guerra, 479 US 272 (1986) (upholding state law requiring
unpaid pregnancy leave against Title VII challenge).
25. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause at 84 (cited in note 20).
26. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 215 (Harvard U Press,
1989).
27. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal L Rev 1279 (1987).
28. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U Pa L Rev 955 (1984).
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that is highly individualistic and confined to assessing the rationality of means. I also
want to outline another mediating principle-the group-disadvantaging principleone that has as good, if not better, claim to represent the ideal of equality, one that
takes a fuller account of social reality, and one
that more clearly focuses the issues that
29
must be decided in equal protection cases.

Professor MacKinnon presented the issue in the following way:
The analytical point of departure and return of sex discrimination law is thus the
liberal one of gender differences, understood rationally or irrationally to create
gender inequalities. The feminist issue, by contrast, is gender hierarchy, which not
only produces inequalities but shapes the social meaning, hence legal relevance, of the
sex difference. To the extent that the biology of one sex is a social disadvantage, while
the biology of the other is not, or is a social advantage, the sexes are equally different
but not equally powerful. The issue becomes
the social meaning of biology, not any
30
facticity or object quality of biology itself.

Professor Law has advocated a somewhat similar approach, limited to the
context of laws governing reproductive biology:
If we are persuaded that the fourteenth amendment's equality guarantee constrains
legislative authority to regulate reproductive biology and that such laws raise issues
different from those raised by laws that classify explicitly on the basis of sex, we must
then consider what standard is appropriate for evaluating such laws. I propose that
laws governing reproductive biology should be scrutinized by courts to ensure that (1)
the law has no significant impact in perpetuating either the oppression of women or
culturally imposed sex-role constraints on individual freedom or (2) if the law has
this
31
impact, it is justified as the best means of serving a compelling state purpose.

These approaches have not yet found their way into equal protection
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, however. Instead, the dominant
approach could be termed "assimilationist." In sex discrimination cases, this
approach requires that laws that promote or perpetuate stereotypical views
about or prejudices against either gender be struck down. The result of the
male-based standard inherent in this approach is that women are entitled, at a
maximum, to identical treatment to men to the extent that they are the same
as men. 32 Similarly, in race discrimination cases, even when the existence of
social subordination is acknowledged (as in Brown), such recognition is within
a context of justifying identical treatment. Recognition of social
subordination plays a role in identifying stereotypes and prejudices and
understanding what makes them invidious. But as Professor MacKinnon
argues:
To stereotype is to impose a trait or characterization that may be true of some
members of a group upon all in the group. As an account of the injury of
discrimination, this notion of misrepresentation by generalization is limited and can
even be perverse. What if the stereotype-such as women enjoy rape-is not really
true of anyone? What if, to the extent a stereotype is accurate, it is a product of abuse,
like passivity, or a survival strategy, like manipulativeness? What if, to the degree it is
real, it signals an imposed reality that needs to be changed, like a woman's place is in
the home? What if the stereotype is ideologically injurious but materially helpful, like
maternal preference in child custody cases? What ifa stereotype is injurious as a basis
29.
30.

Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause at 85 (cited in note 20).
MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State at 232 (cited in note 26).

31. Law, 132 U Pa L Rev at 1008-09 (cited in note 28).
32. An example of an exception is Guerra, 479 US 272 (upholding legislation requiring
employers to provide unpaid maternity leave to employees).
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for policy whether or not accurate, such as the view that women are not interested in
jobs with higher salaries? Further, why is it an injury to be considered a member of a
group of which one 3is, in fact, a member? Is the injury perhaps more how that group
3
is actually treated?

The dominant approach in cases involving other "real differences," such as
religious practices, or physical or mental handicapping conditions, also could
be termed "assimilationist." Professor Martha Minow has described the
"dilemma of difference" and argued that
trying to take seriously the point of view of people labeled "different" is a way to move
beyond current difficulties in the treatment of differences in our society. This last
statement . . . is addressed to people in positions of sufficient power to label others
"different" and to make choices about how to treat difference. If you have such
power, you may realize the dilemma of difference: by taking another person's
difference into account in awarding goods or distributing burdens, you risk reiterating
the significance of that difference and, potentially, its stigma and stereotyping
consequences. But if you do not take another person's difference into account-in a
world that has made that difference matter-you may also recreate and reestablish
34
both the difference and its negative implications.

People labeled "different" because of race, national or ethnic origin,
physical or mental disability, age, religion, or sex frequently are on the
bottom of a hierarchy. The angle of their vision is as important as the
substance of what they see. With respect to certain inequality problems,
people at the bottom of a hierarchy may conclude that they need identical
treatment to those at the top. Quite often, however, those who see inequality
problems from that angle, especially persons with disabilities, women, and
members of ethnic, racial, or religious groups who desire to maintain their
identity, will conclude that something else is needed to remedy the situation.
The "something else" will vary with the particulars of the inequality problem.
It will be whatever is necessary to alleviate the disadvantage, that is, to make
5
the difference costless. 3
Much of the debate in Canada prior to the first word from the Supreme
Court (which came in Andrews, 36 almost four years after the equality
guarantees became effective on April 17, 1985) centred on the extent to which
Canadian courts, in construing section 15 of the Charter,3 7 should deviate
33.
(1991).
34.
35.
27).
36.
citizens
did not

Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality under Law, 100 Yale LJ 1281, 1292-93
Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv L Rev 10, 71 (1987).
This is Professor Littleton's expression; see Littleton, 75 Cal L Rev at 1285 (cited in note

[ 1989] 1 SCR 143. The issue in the case was whether provincial legislation prohibiting nonfrom practising law contravened § 15 of the Charter. The Court held that it did, and that it
constitute a "reasonable limit" within the meaning of § 1 of the Charter, which reads:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.
Therefore, the legislation was struck down pursuant to § 52(1) of the Constitution Act of 1982,
which reads:
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of
no force or effect.
37. The text of § 15 is as follows:
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from the path broken by the U.S. Supreme Court in its equal protection
jurisprudence.
However, the U.S. jurisprudence on equal protection has not proven to be
very influential in Canada. Instead, the most direct and important influence
seems to have come from the Canadian jurisprudence under provincial and
federal human rights legislation. That legislation concerns discrimination in
employment, housing, services, and facilities customarily available to the
public, where the discrimination is based on factors such as race, sex, religion,
age, or disability. In human rights decisions in the 1980s, the Court
developed a definition of "discrimination" that extends to unintended effects
of neutral rules or practices, 3 8 that looks to the effect of a law on groups as
well as on individuals, 3 9 that requires employers to accommodate employee
needs unless the employer thereby suffers undue hardship, 40 and that stems
from an understanding of the realities of gender inequality in the workplace. 4 1
The Court built upon that foundation in its first decisions under section 15
42
construing the constitutional equality guarantee.
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that
are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.
38. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Simpsons-Sears Lid, [1985] 2 SCR 536, 547, where the
Court said:
The Code aims at the removal of discrimination. This is to state the obvious. Its main
approach, however, is not to punish the discriminator, but rather to provide relief for the
victims of discrimination. It is the result or the effect of the action complained of which is
significant. If it does, in fact, cause discrimination; if its effect is to impose on one person or
group of persons obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other
members of the community, it is discriminatory.
39. Canadian National Railway Co. v Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission); Action Travaildes
Femmes, [1987] 1 SCR 1114, 1138-39 (combined on appeal), where the Court quoted with approval
this definition of discrimination from the Report of the Royal Commission on Equality in
Employment:
Discrimination ... means practices or attitudes that have, whether by design or impact,
the effect of limiting an individual's or a group's right to the opportunities generally
available because of attributed rather than actual characteristics....
It is not a question of whether this discrimination is motivated by an intentional desire to
obstruct someone's potential, or whether it is the accidental by-product of innocently
motivated practices or systems. If the barrier is affecting certain groups in a
disproportionately negative way, it is a signal that the practices that lead to this adverse
impact may be discriminatory.
40. CentralAlberta Dairy Pool v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [ 1990] 2 SCR 489, 517 (holding
that an employer must attempt to accommodate, to the point of undue hardship, the religious beliefs
of an employee who is adversely affected by the employer's policies).
41. Action Travail des Femmes, [1987] 1 SCR 1114 (approving an affirmative action remedy for
proven systemic discrimination); Robichaud v Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 SCR 84 (finding an
employer vicariously responsible for sexual harassment); Brooks v Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 SCR
1219 (holding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is sex discrimination); Janzen v Platy
Enterprises Ltd., [1989] 1 SCR 1252 (holding that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination).
42. The decisions in Brooks andJanzen were both subsequent to Andrews. However, it seems fair
to view them as part of the same series of human rights decisions as those cited. In fact, they
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In Andrews, which concerned provincial legislation imposing a citizenship
requirement for the practice of law, the Court wholly rejected the "similarly
situated test." 43 As a result of taking a purposive approach to the
interpretation of section 1544 (consistent with its approach to the
interpretation of other parts of the Charter), the Court added a third
dimension-the existence of comparative disadvantage.
Justice McIntyre (for the majority in this section of his opinion, although
he dissented as to the result in Andrews) concluded that the language of
section 15 was deliberately chosen to remedy some of the perceived defects of
the right to equality in the predecessor Canadian Bill of Rights, 4 5 such as the
conclusion in Bliss 4 6 that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, a sex-

specific characteristic, did not contravene the guarantee of "equality before
the law ... without discrimination based on sex." Justice McIntyre continued:
It must be recognized, however, as well that the promotion of equality under s. 15
has a much more specific goal than the mere elimination of discrimination. If the
Charter was intended to eliminate all distinctions, then there would be no place for
sections such as 27 (multicultural heritage); 2(a) (freedom of conscience and religion);
25 (aboriginal rights and freedoms); and other such provisions designed to safeguard
certain distinctions. Moreover, the fact that identical treatment may frequently
produce serious inequality is recognized in s. 15(2), which states that the equality
rights in s. 15(1) do "not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object
47
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups ....

Justice McIntyre proceeded to define "discrimination":
I would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether
intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the
individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or
disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which
withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other
members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an
individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge

illustrate the close connection between constitutional equality jurisprudence and human rights
jurisprudence. Andrews develops a definition of discrimination to be used in interpreting the
constitutional equality guarantee in large measure through examining the human rights experience.
The Andrews definition is then used in Brooks andJanzen to re-assess the meaning of sex discrimination
under human rights legislation.
43. This was done essentially because of the inadequacies described earlier. See text at Part IIA.
See also Andrews, [19891 1 SCR at 165-68 (opinion of McIntyre); McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR at 391-92
(Wilson dissenting). Writing for the McKinney plurality, Justice La Forest opined:
The second argument was that the similarly situated test is still the governing test,
provided it is not applied mechanically. Simply put, I do not believe that the similarly
situated test can be applied other than mechanically, and I do not believe that it survived
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia.

Id at 279.
44. The purposive approach requires that the court look to "the character and the larger objects
of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the
historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and ... to the meaning and purpose of the other specific
rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter." R. v Big M Drug Mart
Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295, 344.
45. RSC 1985, App III, § 1(b).
46. [1979] 1 SCR 183.
47. Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR at 171.
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while those based on an individual's merits and capacities will rarely
of discrimination,
48
be so classed.

The Court concluded that section 15 is focused on claims that involve
either the human characteristics listed in section 15 (race, national or ethnic

origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability) or
characteristics analogous to those. In Andrews itself the claim was brought by a
non-citizen who was prevented for that reason from practising law in the

province of British Columbia. This was seen as an analogous characteristic.
Other analogous grounds are likely to be found in areas covered by human
rights legislation or by Canada's commitments under international law, such
as marital status, sexual orientation, or political belief.4 9 Claims outside these
areas (for example, claims by manufacturers of certain products that
governmental regulation affects them in ways not touching their competitors)
are not cognizable under section 15. "Generic" claims were disallowed
because of the Court's conclusion that the purpose of section 15 is the
50
alleviation of the kinds of disadvantage exemplified by the listed grounds.
Unfortunately, the catch-phrase "discrete and insular minority" has been
used on occasion by the Canadian Supreme Court in attempts to describe the
focus of section 15. 5 1 This phrase carries the baggage of its own origins in the
48. Id at 174-75.
49. See, for example, Knodel v British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), 58 Brit Col L Rep (2d)
356 (SC 1991) (provincial legislation denying same-sex couples the same medical insurance coverage
as heterosexual couples held to infringe § 15(1) of the Charter). See also Leroux v Co-operators General
Insurance Co., 4 Ont Rep (3d) 609 (CA 1991) (marital status held not to be an analogous ground to
those delineated in § 15 of the Charter. Thus automobile insurance legislation treating unmarried
and married couples differently was upheld).
50. See Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR at 182 (opinion of McIntyre) (stating that the "enumerated and
analogous grounds" approach most closely accords with the purposes of § 15). For a discussion of
why it might be necessary to exclude claims brought by the non-disadvantaged and by those who are
persistently disadvantaged for idiosyncratic reasons, in order to permit the purpose of § 15 to be
fulfilled, see Black & Smith, The Equality Rights 557 (cited in note 7).
51. See, for example, the Reasons in Rudolph Wolff & Co. v Canada, [1990] 1 SCR 695, 702
(opinion of Cory):
The impugned legislation granting the Federal Court exclusive jurisdiction over claims
against the Crown in right of Canada does not distinguish between classes of individuals on
the basis of any of the grounds enumerated in s. 15(1) nor on any analogous grounds.
Certainly, it cannot be said that individuals claiming relief against the Federal Crown are, in
the words of Wilson J. in R. v Turpin . . . "a discrete and insular minority" or "a
disadvantaged group in Canadian society within the contemplation of s. 15." Rather, they
are a disparate group with the sole common interest of seeking to bring a claim against the
Crown before a court.
Justice Cory certainly is not making "discrete and insular minority" the sole touchstone, since
there is the alternative reference to "a disadvantaged group in Canadian society within the
contemplation of s. 15." But there is the danger that this phrase will become a misleading shorthand
invocation of the concept.
For an example of a lower court drastically misled by the "discrete and insular minority" catchphrase, see Gould v Yukon Order of Pioneers, 14 Can Human Rts Rptr D/176 (Sept 1991), wherein the
issue was whether a woman was denied services offered or provided to the public because of her sex,
contrary to the Human Rights Act, S Y 1987, ch 3, when she was refused membership in an all-male
organisation. Justice Wachowich quoted the Supreme Court's decision in Turpin, saying:
But if discrimination in s. 15 of the Charteris to be defined in terms of "minorities," then
it is less readily apparent that it is available to combat allegedly discriminatory behaviour
against all women. In my view women, as a group, are not what is commonly understood to
be a "minority" in Canadian society. The intervener stated that a recent Yukon census
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Carolene Products footnote and of the "representation-reinforcing" theory of
equal protection law advocated by U.S. commentators such as John Hart
Ely. 52 The baggage and the phrase itself seem inconsistent with the Canadian

approach to equality, which derives from a significantly different history and
political culture. Further, the phrase is inconsistent with the very wording of
section 15. Inequalities based on sex, age, disability, religion, race, and
national or ethnic origin all share equally in the raison d'etre of section 15;
race-based discrimination, from which the "discrete and insular minority"
formulation was derived, is not given primacy. While it is tempting to try to
find a single common thread running through the named grounds in order to
derive a principle to analogize them to other grounds, it is not necessary to
succeed in this search to provide a coherent meaning for the section. There
can be several threads, such that all of the grounds share in some of them
even though no single thread is shared by all. If there is a single overall
thread, it is power imbalance-the listed grounds characterize groups that
historically have suffered disempowerment in Canadian society. Other
features common to most of the grounds include: relative permanency of the
characteristic; a history of animosity or bias toward those who possess it; lack
of control over it; and its importance to the individual's sense of worth and
identity. 53 The "discrete and insular minority" concept captures some of

those features, but certainly not all. Thus, it cannot be used as a sine qua non
test for analogous grounds.
Read in context, however, the "discrete and insular minority" concept
does form only part of the test. Justice Wilson said in Andrews:
I believe also that it is important to note that the range of discrete and insular

minorities has changed and will continue to change with changing political and social
circumstances. For example, Stone, J. writing in 1938, was concerned with religious,
national and racial minorities. In enumerating the specific grounds in s. 15, the
framers of the Charter embraced those concerns in 1982 but also addressed
themselves to the difficulties experienced by the disadvantaged on the grounds of
ethnic origin, colour, sex, age and physical and mental disability. It can be anticipated
that the discrete and insular minorities of tomorrow will include groups not
recognized as such today. It is consistent with the constitutional status of s. 15 that it
to ensure the 'unremitting protection' of
be interpreted with sufficient flexibility
54
equality rights in the years to come.

Justice Wilson also pointed out that the determination of whether or not a
categorization is analogous to those enumerated in section 15 "is a
determination which is not to be made only in the context of the law which is
subject to challenge but rather in the context of the place of the group in the
showed that 53.1 percent of the population was male, while 46.9 percent was female.
Whether this constitutes a minority that can be discriminated against is in doubt.
Id at D/190.
52. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard U Press, 1980).
This theory finds justification for judicial review of legislative action only where there is a basis for
concluding that the democratic process is inadequate-for example, with respect to a discrete and
insular minority such as African-Americans.
53. For fuller discussion of this point, see Black & Smith, The Equality Rights at 586 (cited in note
54.

[1989] 1 SCR at 152-53.
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entire social, political and legal fabric of our society." 5 5 In Regina v. Turpin,5 6
a case decided shortly after Andrews, the Court reaffirmed that the dimension
of disadvantage should be determined externally to the legislation. The
importance of this point cannot be overstated. Invariably, where the decision
to litigate is at least minimally rational, legislation that someone sees fit to
litigate disadvantages the party complaining. But how does the party
complaining fit into overall patterns of societal disadvantage? And, if the
claim succeeds, will it alleviate the patterns of disadvantage identified by the
grounds in section 15 or those analogous to them? Or will the claim, if
successful, reinforce those patterns?
It may also follow from Turpin that discrimination claims, even if based on
traits named in section 15, will fail unless the outcome would substantively
alleviate disadvantage. 57 As was stated by the Turpin Court:
In determining whether there is discrimination on grounds relating to the personal
characteristics of the individual or group, it is important to look not only at the
impugned legislation which has created a distinction that violates the right to equality
but also the larger social, political and legal context. McIntyre J. emphasized in
Andrews (at p. 167): "For, as has been said, a bad law will not be saved merely because
it operates equally upon those to whom it has application. Nor will a law necessarily
be bad because it makes distinctions."
Accordingly, it is only by examining the larger context that a court can determine
whether differential treatment results in inequality or whether, contrariwise, it would
be identical treatment which would in the particular context result in inequality or
foster disadvantage. A finding that there is discrimination will, I think, in most but
perhaps not all cases, necessarily entail a search for disadvantage that exists apart from
and independent of the particular legal distinction being challenged.
If the larger context is not examined, the s. 15 analysis may become a mechanical and
sterile categorization process conducted entirely within the four corners of the
impugned legislation. A determination as to whether or not discrimination is taking
place, if based exclusively on an analysis of the law under challenge, is likely, in my
view, to result in the same kind of circularity which characterized the similarly situated
similarly treated test clearly rejected by this Court in Andrews. 5 8

The Court therefore escaped formalism by rejecting the "similarly
situated" test and adding the dimension of "disadvantage" to the
measurement of equality. In determining whether or not to uphold allegedly
discriminatory legislation, Canadian courts no longer limit their analysis to
whether the claimant and the treatment are sufficiently similar to or different
55. Id at 152.
56. [1989] 1 SCR 1296, 1333 ("discrete and insular minority" classification described as
"merely one of the analytical tools which are of assistance in determining whether the interest
advanced by a particular claimant is the kind of interest s. 15 of the Charter is designed to protect. It
is a means of ensuring that equality rights are given the same kind of broad, purposive interpretation
accorded to other Charter rights . . ."). See also Reference Re Workers' Compensation Act, 1983
(Newfoundland), [1989] 1 SCR 922. In both cases, the categories chosen by the legislatures (in Turpin,
province of trial; in Reference, membership in the workforce and personal injury or death suffered on
the job) were held not to constitute analogous grounds under § 15.
57. For a more detailed discussion of the way in which courts can interpret § 15 to prevent its
use to erode equality-producing legislation (for example, its use by men to strike down legislation
that benefits women in ways that will reduce women's disadvantage), see Black & Smith, The Equality
Rights at 628-46 (cited in note 7).
58. [19891 1 SCR at 1331-32.
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from selected comparators. Instead, the Court will consider whether the
claimant is a member of a group which has experienced persistent
disadvantage on the basis of a personal characteristic, such as those named in
section 15, and whether the questioned classification continues or worsens
that disadvantage.
It is this approach that allowed the Court to hold that section 15 extended
not only to direct or intentional discrimination, but also to adverse impact
discrimination, 59 that is, discrimination that arises from the adverse impact of
a facially neutral rule on a particular group, whether or not this adverse
impact is intended. It may well be that, had the Court not limited the use of
section 15 to exclude "generic" claims,6 0 it would not have been able to find
that section 15 encompassed indirect or adverse impact discrimination. 6'
Thus, by interpreting the Charter's equality guarantees to include adverse
impact discrimination, and by relying on the same concepts as those
developed in the human rights jurisprudence, the Court dramatically
departed from the United States model, where there are divergent approaches
between equal protection cases, which require proof of an intent to
62
discriminate, and Title VII cases, which do not.

59. See Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 SCR at 551, for the
Court's definition of this concept. In this case, the Court held that there was a breach of human
rights legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment based on religion where an employer
required an employee who observed the Sabbath on Saturdays to work on those days. For cases
referring to adverse impact discrimination and the Charter, see McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR at 279
(opinion of La Forest) and Tetreault-Gadoury v Canada (Employment & Immigration Commission), 81 DLR
(4th) 358, 370 (SCC 1991) (holding that the former provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Act
that disentitled unemployed persons over the age of 65 from benefits contravened section 15(1)). It
should be noted that although both the McKinney and Tetreault-Gadoury courts characterized their
respective issues as "adverse impact" discrimination, the issue in both cases was instead direct and
intentional discrimination (express differential treatment of persons over the age of 65). In any
event, the Court has now made it perfectly clear that it will interpret section 15 in a way that does not
require proof of intention.
The context in which the issue arose in both McKinney and Tetreault-Gadoury is illustrated by this
comment in the Tetreault-Gadoury case:
As in McKinney, it was argued here that the policy is not motivated by stereotypical
assumptions, but is based upon "administrative, institutional and socio-economic"
considerations. In McKinney, however, I concluded (at p. 647) that "[t]his is all irrelevant,
since as Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia made clear . . . not only does the Charter
protect from direct or intentional discrimination, it also protects from adverse impact
discrimination, which is what is in issue here.
81 DLR (4th) at 370 (opinion of La Forest).
Thus the Court is rejecting (albeit somewhat obliquely) the argument that somehow
"administrative, institutional and socio-economic" considerations could place legislation in a special
category, immune from § 15 review.
60. See note 50 and accompanying text.
61. Professor William Black and I have argued previously that coverage of adverse impact
discrimination was instrumental to satisfying the purpose of § 15 and that in itself should be a
consideration in deciding whether to limit § 15's scope. See Black & Smith, The Equality Rights 557
(cited in note 7).
62. See Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 238-48 (1976) (holding that a police test that blacks
disproportionately failed did not violate the equal protection clause without proof that the police
department had a discriminatory purpose in administering the exam; if the test had been challenged
under Title VII, a discriminatory purpose would not have been necessary); Village of Arlington Heights v
Metro Housing Development Corp., 429 US 252, 264-71 (1977) (holding that, although the Village's
denial of the zoning necessary for Metro to build racially integrated multiple-housing had a racially
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Implications of the Solution in the Canadian Context

If, as the landmark cases suggest, the purpose of section 15 is to
ameliorate discrimination based upon the classifications listed in section 15
and their analogues, then the section must be understood, by courts and
governments, in a way that provides meaningful protection against those kinds of
discrimination, and thus promotes equality for the groups in question. It is a very
different matter to provide meaningful protection against discrimination and
to promote equality for women or for First Nations people, for example, than
to do so on the basis of some abstract "generic" concept of discrimination
and equality. The understanding of equality and nondiscrimination must be
contextual. In Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General),63 Justice Wilson
discussed a contextual approach to Charter interpretation:
I ask myself therefore whether a contextual approach in balancing the right to
privacy against freedom of the press under s. 1 is not more appropriate than an
approach which assesses the relative importance of the competing values in the
abstract or at large.
One virtue of the contextual approach, it seems to me, is that it recognizes that a
particular right or freedom may have a different value depending on the context. It
may be, for example, that freedom of expression has greater value in a political
context than it does in the context of disclosure of the details of a matrimonial dispute.
The contextual approach attempts to bring into sharp relief the aspect of the right or
freedom which is truly at stake in the case as well as the relevant aspects of any values
in competition with it. It seems to be more sensitive to the reality of the dilemma
posed by the particular facts and therefore more conducive to finding a fair and just
compromise between the two competing values under s. 1.

Thus, the nature and effects of discrimination may be different depending
on the context. For example, discrimination against disabled persons has
certain unique features and requires certain kinds of remedial action.
Conversely, discrimination against the aged raises issues that do not arise in
other contexts. Finally, gendered social roles, as well as the biological
differences between men and women, differentiate sex discrimination from
other forms of discrimination. A reading of section 15 aimed only at the
lowest common denominator, or a reading that adopts just one kind of
discrimination as the paradigm, would be inconsistent with the history,
wording, and purpose of the equality guarantees.
An important part of the Canadian context is its human rights
jurisprudence. In some respects, Canada's human rights jurisprudence goes
no further than that of the United States under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (for example, in recognizing disparate impact discrimination, a
duty to accommodate, and systemic discrimination requiring systemic
remedies). However, incorporating the human rights notion of discrimination
discriminatory effect, the Village could not be held in violation of the equal protection clause without
proof of a racially discriminatory purpose); PersonnelAdministrator of Mass. v Feeney, 442 US 256, 274-

78 (1979) (holding that a Massachusetts veterans preference statute that appointed veterans over
non-veterans to civil service positions, although affecting women disproportionately, did not violate
the equal protection clause in the absence of a discriminatory purpose).
63. [1989] 2 SCR 1326, 1353-56.
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into the interpretation of the constitutional equality guarantee should have
far-reaching consequences. The Court's decision that the concepts of equality
and discrimination should be the same in human rights and constitutional
jurisprudence therefore was crucial.
The overall Canadian social and political context is also relevant. It has
been suggested that Canadian political culture is less liberal-individualistic
and more hospitable to notions of group rights and social rights than is that of
the United States. 64 Evidence may be found not only in the Charter's group
rights guarantees (such as the language rights in sections 16 through 22, the
aboriginal rights in section 25 and in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
the requirement to interpret in a manner consistent with the preservation and
enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians in section 27, and the
protection for denominational schools in section 29), but also in Canadian
political practices (such as the provision of universal government-funded
medical care and the federal programs to promote bilingualism). The
inclusion of section 15(2) in the Charter, specifically permitting affirmative
action programs, not only ensures that Canada will not replicate the debate in
the U.S. regarding the use of such programs, but also supports the view that
64. Professor Charles Fried represented the liberal U.S. position in the opening sentence to his
Comment: Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 Harv L Rev 107 (1990):
"Except for the shameful and discredited 'separate but equal' doctrine of Plessy v Ferguson, the
Supreme Court has always adhered to a liberal, individualistic view of the equal protection
guarantee."
In a section of her Reasons in McKinney, [1990] 3 SCR at 343, Justice Wilson compared the U.S.
and Canadian constitutional traditions:
The doctrine of constitutionalism was a driving force behind the creation of the
American constitution. The American Bill of Rights was in large measure the product of a
revolution. Unhappy with the injustices the Americans perceived were perpetrated against
them by the British, the American people were left with a deep distrust of powerful states.
The United States Constitution enshrines the belief of the American people that unless the
state is strictly controlled it poses a great danger to individual liberty. Its primary focus,
articulated in the bulk of its provisions, is against "state action." Canada does not share this
history.
In Robin Elliot, The Supreme Court of Canadaand Section 1-The Erosion of the Common Front, 12 Queen's
L J 277, 282-83 (1987), Elliot commented that there is a strong liberal tradition in Canada, but
pointed to a number of other aspects of the Charter that suggested otherwise:
The fact that the Charter reflects the collectivist view of the relationship between the
individual and the state and of the role of the state is hardly surprising to anyone familiar
with Canadian political traditions. Liberalism has never held the exalted position in Canada
that it has in the United States. The United Empire Loyalists who came north at the time of
the American Revolution brought with them a "tory touch" that has always been, and
remains to this day, a significant feature of our political culture.
The ability of socialist parties to establish themselves as a viable political force in Canada is
another reflection of the collectivist tradition in our political culture. Different from toryism
in many important respects, socialism nevertheless shares with it the belief that society is
more than a collection of rugged, self-interested individuals. It also, of course, allows for a
significant role for the state ....

See also the interesting discussion of these aspects of Canadian political culture in Martha Jackman,
The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter, -20 Ottawa L Rev 257, 257-67 (1988) (Under article 7
of the Charter, which guarantees that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice," freedom means not only freedom from government restriction, but also the
ability to benefit equally from opportunities provided by the government.).
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the purpose of section 15 is to promote equality, not just prevent
discrimination.
The equality guarantees have also shaped the Supreme Court of Canada's
interpretation of other parts of the Charter. In Regina v. Keegstra,6 5 for
example, the Court addressed the constitutional validity of the Criminal Code
sections prohibiting hate propaganda. The Court held that the legislation
violated the guarantee of freedom of expression. However, after concluding
that the purpose of the Criminal Code sections was connected with furthering
the equality and multiculturalism guarantees in the Charter, it upheld the
legislation as a reasonable limit to freedom of expression. 6 6 The Court stated
its agreement with this proposition from an intervener's brief:
Government sponsored hatred on group grounds would violate section 15 of the
Charter. Parliament promotes equality and moves against inequality when it prohibits
the wilful public promotion of group hatred on these grounds. It follows that
government action against group hate, because it promotes social equality as
guaranteed by the Charter, deserves special constitutional consideration under section
15.67

Another example is provided by the Supreme Court decision in Reference Re
Electoral Boundaries Commission Act (Saskatchewan), 68 where the Court held that
the purpose of the electoral rights guaranteed by section 3 of the Charter is
"effective representation," not the rigid formal equality that one-person onevote represents. Although section 15 was not referred to, the Court's
approach was consistent with, and probably shaped by, the equality
jurisprudence.
In applying the Charter's equality guarantees, problems have arisen due to
the amount of latitude given by courts to legislatures when courts assess,
pursuant to section
"reasonable limit ...

whether the discriminating legislation constitutes a
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society"
(in which case the legislation stands). 70 Thus, the latitude given to
legislatures under section 1 could undermine the strength of the protections
guaranteed in section 15.71

65.
66.
67.
68.

1,69

[1990] 3 SCR 697.
Id at 755-56 (opinion of Dickson).
Id at 756 (quoting brief of intervener Women's Legal Education and Action Fund).
81 DLR (4th) 16, 35-38 (SCC 1991) (also referred to as Carter v Saskatchewan (Attorney

General)).

69. An analysis of the jurisprudence under § I is well beyond the scope of this article. To
summarize, however, recent decisions have upheld legislation, pursuant to § 1, so long as the court
concludes that the government had pressing and substantial objectives rationally connected with the
legislation, and that the government had a reasonable basis for concluding that the legislation
impaired the rights as little as possible given the objectives sought to be achieved. 11cKinney, [1990]
3 SCR at 288-89, following Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney-General), [1989] 1 SCR 927, 994.
70. The full text of § 1 is set out in note 36.
7 1. Tetreault-Gadoury, 81 DLR (4th) at 374, does, however, show that at least some legislation will
fail the current § I test.
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III
SEX-BASED INEQUALITY

72

There are three aspects of the Canadian context that must be considered
to understand the Canadian Supreme Court's approach to sex equality cases.
The first aspect is that Canada is a signatory to the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women. 7 3 According to the preamble to the Convention, despite various
international resolutions, declarations, and recommendations, "extensive
discrimination against women continues to exist." The preamble goes on to
recite particular examples, such as: "in situations of poverty women have the
least access to food, health, education, training and opportunities for
employment and other needs .

. . ."

The preamble also notes the extent to

which women are penalized for their role in procreation:
Bearing in mind the great contribution of women to the welfare of the family and to
the development of society, so far not fully recognized, the social significance of
maternity and the role of both parents in the family and in the upbringing of children,
and aware that the role of women in procreation should not be a basis for
discrimination but that the upbringing of children requires a sharing of responsibility
between men and women and society as a whole .... 74

Canada has thus signed an international instrument that identifies the
problem as "discrimination against women"
(not generic "sex
discrimination") and contemplates the provision of positive social benefits as
75
appropriate measures to remedy such discrimination.
72. I will pay special attention to this area for two reasons. First, it is the one with which I am
most familiar. Second, of the listed grounds in § 15 it is the one with respect to which there has been
the most judicial activity. (However, there have still been comparatively few cases based upon any of
the enumerated grounds, including sex.) Therefore, it provides some opportunity to test the
application of the approach to equality rights developed in Andrews.
73. In force for Canada in 1982.
74. Among other matters, the Convention requires, in Article 11:
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or
maternity, and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate
measures:
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of
pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital
status;
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without
loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances;
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable
parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in
public life, in particular through promoting the establishment and development of a
network of child-care facilities;
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved
to be harmful to them.
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be reviewed
periodically in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised,
repealed or extended as necessary.
75. Consistent with its obligations, the Canadian government does provide unemployment
insurance benefits to women who require maternity leave, as well as parental leave benefits to either
member of a couple with a newborn or adopted child. Canadian jurisdictions have maternity leave
provisions with protection against dismissal or change in conditions of employment. For example,
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The Charter is seen as one of the mechanisms by which the Canadian
government is working to fulfil its obligations under the Convention. This is
exemplified by Canada's second report to the United Nations Committee
under the Convention, which referred to section 15 of the Charter and to
Canadian human rights legislation as the "primary means of implementing
the Convention in Canada."' 76 Read in the light of the Convention, section 15
is not designed to provide a means for men to attack legislative or
governmental measures that women require, such as maternity benefits or
Family Allowance payments, just as it is not designed to provide a means for
the able-bodied to complain about services provided to the disabled, 77 nor to
prohibit affirmative action programs to ameliorate the disadvantage of racial
minorities. 7 8 It would be wholly inconsistent with the purpose of the equality
guarantees (the purpose being, in the words of the Supreme Court of Canada,
"the removal of unfair disadvantages which have been imposed on individuals
or groups in society" 7 9 ) to permit individuals to use them to remove positive
beneficial measures for disadvantaged persons or groups. Thus, a purposive
interpretation of section 15 leads to the conclusion that either it must have
very limited application in claims brought by those who are comparatively
advantaged, or it cannot permit remedies that result in removing positive
benefits from the comparatively disadvantaged. 80
the British Columbia Employment Standards Act (Maternity Leave), ch 10, pt 7, 5 SBC § 51(i)(1980)
provides that
[a]n employee, on her written request supported by a certificate of a medical practitioner
stating that the employee is pregnant and estimating the probable date of birth of the child,
is entitled to a leave of absence from work, without pay, for a period of 18 consecutive weeks
or a shorter period the employee requests, commencing 11 weeks immediately before the
estimated date of birth or a later time the employee requests.
Firing an employee or changing the employee's condition of employment because of the employee's
pregnancy or because of an absence authorized by part 7 is prohibited. Under § 55, the burden of
proving cause of termination or change in condition is on the employer. Under § 51(2), the
maternity leave is not to end before six weeks after the actual date of the birth of the child, no matter
when the leave began. Under § 51(3), the employee may request a shorter period.
76. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women: Second
Report of Canada 2 (Ministry of Supply and Services, 1988).
77. The wording of § 15 precludes such complaints-§ 15 provides for equality before and
under the law, and equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination based on
mental or physical disability.
78. Charter § 15(2).
79. Brooks, [1989] 1 SCR at 1238.
80. For more extensive discussion of this issue, see Black & Smith, The Equality Rights at 633-37
(cited in note 7). U.S. courts have developed the remedy of extension, which can be used to avoid
striking down legislation that is underinclusive. For a case in which the availability of this remedy is
being litigated in Canada, see Schachter v Canada, 52 DLR (4th) 525 (Fed TD 1988), aff'd, 66 DLR
(4th) 635 (Fed CA 1990). The Federal Court of Appeal held:
In my view, s. 24 does empower a court to extend benefits to groups aggrieved by an
exclusion of benefits. Such an extension of benefits appears to be the only remedy which
respects the purposive nature of the Charter while at the same time giving effect to the
equality rights enshrined in s. 15 of the Charter.
Schachter, 66 DLR (4th) at 652. Note that Schachter is on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
For a thoughtful comment on Schachter, see Nitya Duclos & Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies as
'ConstitutionalHints': A Comment on R. v. Schachter, 36 McGill L 1 (1991). For academic commentary
on this aspect of remedies, see Dale Gibson, Non-Destructive Charter Response to Legislative Inequalities. 27
Alta L Rev 181, 183 (1989) (due to § 26 of the Charter, judges are under an obligation, when
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The second aspect of the Canadian context is section 28 of the Charter,
which provides that, "notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and
freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female
persons." Although section 28 has not explicitly played a major role in the
decisions to date, its spirit has influenced the approach taken by the Court in
some cases, such as Regina v. Morgentaler.8 1
enforcing charter rights, to employ methods that "will derogate from existing rights to the least
extent possible"); Dale Gibson, The Law of the Charter: Equality Rights 339-50 (Carswell, 1990) (when
offering an aggrieved party a remedy under § 24(1) of the Charter for an equal protection violation, a
court must minimize any resulting derogation of other rights (for example, peripheral damage)). See
also Richard Gold, From Right to Remedy: Putting Equality to Work, 14 Queen's LJ 213, 233-241 (1989)
(general discussion of available remedies for underinclusive programs).
81. Explicit discussion of § 28 does appear in R. v Hess; R. v Nguyen, [ 1990] 2 SCR 906. In Hess,
the Court addressed the validity of the "statutory rape" provision of the Criminal Code (§ 146(1)),
which made it an indictable offence for a male person to have sexual intercourse with a female person
who was under the age of 14 years and who was not his wife, irrespective of his belief about her age.
(By the time the Court decided Hess, § 146(1) had been repealed and replaced with a section that was
not gender-specific and that allowed for a defence of due diligence.) The majority (Chief Justice
Lamer, Justices La Forest, Wilson and L'Heureux-Dube, per Justice Wilson) held that the section
violated the Charter's § 7 guarantee of life, liberty, and security of the person, which were not to be
deprived without complying with the principles of fundamental justice.
Although only men could be charged under the provision, and only females were protected by the
section, the Court also held, in dicta, that the provision did not infringe § 15 of the Charter. Justice
Wilson wrote for the majority:
But if the impugned provision creates an offence that involves acts which, as a matter of fact,
can only be committed by one sex, then it is not obvious that s. 15(1) of the Charter is
infringed. In such a case there may well be a reason related to sex for creating an offence
that can only be committed by one sex. I am, of course, fully aware of the dangers inherent
in arguments that seek to justify particular distinctions on the basis of alleged sex-related
factors....
Nevertheless, there are certain biological realities that one cannot ignore and that may
legitimately shape the definition of particular offences. In my view, the fact that the
legislature has defined an offence in relation to these realities will not necessarily trigger s.
15(1) of the Charter. I think few would venture to suggest that a provision proscribing selfinduced abortion could be characterized as discriminatory because it did not apply to men.
Such an argument would be absurd. In my view, s. 15(1) does not prevent the creation of an
offence which, as a matter of biological fact, can only be committed by one of the sexes
because of the unique nature of the acts that are proscribed.
Id at 928-29. This dictum, however, is problematic because it is inconsistent with the understanding
of equality developed by the Court in several cases decided shortly before Hess: Andrews, [1989] 1
SCR 143, Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR 1296, and Brooks, [1989] 1 SCR 1219. The Hess dictum suggests that
there is no need to look at the social, political, or legal contexts in which the distinction is drawn if it
reflects a "biological reality" (contrary to Andrews and Turpin), and that equality problems cannot
arise when legal distinctions are drawn to match "biological realities" (contrary to Brooks). It is
possible, however, that Justice Wilson intended to indicate that an offence directed at one sex only
does not automatically violate § 15, a position consistent with the other cases. Unless the Hess decision
is to represent a total, and unacknowledged, about-face on the prescribed treatment of sex-specific
equality issues mapped out in Andrews and Brooks, it must be read in this limited way.
The reference to § 28 (that the provisions of the Charter "are guaranteed equally to male and
female persons") by the majority reinforces this point. According to Justice Wilson, "this provision
does not prevent the legislature from creating an offence that as a matter of biological fact can only
be committed by one sex." Id at 932. The dissent, written by Justice McLachlin for herself and
Justice Gonthier, however, refers to § 28 in the context of the argument that men, as a group, are not
disadvantaged within the meaning of the Turpin test for the application of § 15. Justice McLachlin
wrote:
In my view, these arguments take the interpretation of the language in 7Tupin further than is
justified. There is no suggestion in that language that men should be excluded from
protection under s. 15 because they do not constitute a "discrete and insular minority"
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The third aspect is the Supreme Court's occasional willingness to question
the assumptions underlying positive law or legal theory and to revise
doctrines or approaches where these assumptions seem to reflect
predominantly male experience or male-centred norms, thus operating to the
disadvantage of women. The following examples will elucidate this point.
In Morgentaler,82 the Supreme Court struck down the former Criminal
Code abortion legislation based on its violation of the section 7 guarantee of
security of the person. According to section 7, "[e]veryone has the right to
life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."
Justice Wilson's concurrence, in which she discussed the concept of
liberty, was the first clear indication that a member of the Court was willing to
question laws because of their underlying assumptions. Referring to the
individual woman's decision about whether or not to carry a pregnancy to
term, Wilson stated: "It is not just a medical decision; it is a profound social
and ethical one as well. Her response to it will be the response of the whole
8 3

person."

Justice Wilson then went on to question the assumptions behind the
concept of "liberty":
It is probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively, to such a
dilemma not just because it is outside the realm of his personal experience (although
this is, of course, the case) but because he can relate to it only by objectifying it,
thereby eliminating the subjective elements of the female psyche which are at the heart
of the dilemma. As Noreen Burrows, lecturer in European Law at the University of
Glasgow, has pointed out . . . the history of the struggle for human rights from the
eighteenth century on has been the history of men struggling to assert their dignity
and common humanity against an overbearing state apparatus. The more recent
struggle for women's rights has been a struggle to eliminate discrimination, to achieve
a place for women in a man's world, to develop a set of legislative reforms in order to
place women in the same position as men ....
It has not been a struggle to define the
rights of women in relation to their special place in the societal structure and in
relation to the biological distinction between the two sexes. Thus, women's.needs and
disadvantaged independently of the legislation under consideration. The Court must be
taken to have had in mind s. 28 of the Charter, which provides that notwithstanding any
other provisions, the rights and freedoms referred to in the Charter are guaranteed equally
to male and female persons.
Hess, [1990] 2 SCR at 943-44.
There is insufficient space to discuss these comments here; for a detailed argument suggesting a
way to determine disadvantage, see generally Black & Smith, The Equality Rights (cited in note 7). A
brief response is that without categorically excluding men from the protection of § 15, depending
upon the context, the relative advantage of men and women must be considered in assessing the
merits of a § 15 claim. If this is not possible, § 15 could lead, ironically, to a poorer situation for
women than if it had not been enacted since it could provide a means to strike down hard-won
legislative gains designed to remedy social inequality for women.
Although Justice McLachlin held that the statutory rape provision violated § 15, she concluded
that it was saved by § I as a "reasonable limit," basing her conclusion in this regard upon the kind of
assessment of the social context (the risk of exploitation of young girls by older men, the risk of
pregnancy, the social evil of juvenile prostitution) that was also implicit in Justice Wilson's
conclusion that there was no violation in the first place. For an insightful case comment on Hess, see
William Black & Isabel Grant, Equality and Biological Differences, 79 CR (3d) 372 (1990).
82. [1988] 1 SCR 30.

83.

Id at 171 (Wilson concurring).

Page 211: Winter 1992]

EQUALITY GUARANTEES

aspirations are only now being translated into protected rights. The right to
reproduce or not to reproduce which is in issue in this case is one such right and is
her dignity
properly perceived as an integral
84 part of modern woman's struggle to assert
and worth as a human being.

Justice Wilson's opinion implicitly asserts that Charter rights must be
understood so as to account for the fact that women are now fully human in
the eyes of the law. Historically, courts have not interpreted the rights of
citizenship or human rights in such a manner. Rather, courts have tended to
understand these rights "generically." However, because such "generic"
interpretations tend to derive primarily from male life experiences, they are
85
generic only on the surface.
Although Morgentaler never mentioned section 28 of the Charter, this
section arguably mandated the Court's conclusion. For the rights of liberty
and security of the person to be guaranteed equally to male and female
persons, as section 28 requires, courts must construe "persons" in the
feminine as well as the masculine, and "liberty" and "security of the person"
to be guaranteed for women as women, as opposed to being meaningful only in
situations where women's and men's experiences coincide.
In Regina v. Lavallee,8 6 the Supreme Court reevaluated the criminal law of
self-defence in cases of battered women who kill their common-law spouses.
The Court concluded that the person pleading self-defence does not always
need to establish an apprehension of imminent danger at the moment of the
act. "Given the relational context in which the violence occurs, the mental
state of an accused at the critical moment she pulls the trigger cannot be
understood except in terms of the cumulative effect of months or years of
brutality." 8 7 The Criminal Code justifies the use of force in repelling an
assault where the accused acted "under reasonable apprehension of death or
grievous bodily harm." 8 8 The Court stated that "[t]he definition of what is
reasonable must be adapted to circumstances which are, by and large, foreign
to the world inhabited by the hypothetical 'reasonable man,' ''89 such as the
circumstances of a woman trapped in an abusive relationship.
Although there was no allegation that the Code infringed a Charter right
in Lavallee, the decision illustrates the manner in which the existence of
Charter rights influences the interpretations of statutes and judge-made law.
The Supreme Court has referred to this role for the Charter, discussing the
"question whether the judiciary ought to apply and develop the principles of
the common law in a manner consistent with the fundamental values
84. Id at 171-72.
85. Considering the following questions illuminates this point: If the notion of "liberty" had
been developed by women, or by women and men together, would it be the notion we are familiar
with in classic liberal theory? How likely is it that a woman's need to resist state interference with her
reproductive autonomy, at the instigation of the state itself or of men claiming an interest in her
reproductive capacity, would only recently have been seen as connected with "liberty"?
86. 76 CR (3d) 329 (1990).
87. Id at 350-51.
88. Defense of Person, Criminal Code, ch C-46, RSC § 34(2)(a) (1985).
89. 76 CR (3d) at 346.
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enshrined in the Constitution.- 90 The language of sections 28 and 15 makes
it clear that gender equality is one of those fundamental values. It therefore
follows that the impact of the Charter guarantees may be felt as much in nonCharter cases as in actual constitutional disputes.
Perhaps the most far-reaching example is Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd. ,9 in
which a group of pregnant employees filed a complaint under the Manitoba
Human Rights Act claiming that the employer's sickness and accident benefits
plan discriminated on the basis of sex. The plan excluded pregnant women
from coverage during a seventeen-week period around their expected delivery
dates. The Human Rights tribunal and lower courts rejected the plaintiffs'
complaint, in part because of the 1978 Bliss decision. 9 2 As well as relying on
Bliss, the employer argued that pregnancy is neither an accident nor an illness,
but a voluntary act. In rejecting the plan as discriminatory, the unanimous
Court held:
It seems indisputable that in our society pregnancy is a valid health-related reason
for being absent from work. It is to state the obvious to say that pregnancy is of
fundamental importance in our society. Indeed its importance makes description
difficult. To equate pregnancy with, for instance, a decision to undergo medical
treatment for cosmetic surgery-which sort of comparison the respondent's argument
implicitly makes-is fallacious. If the medical condition associated with procreation
does not provide a legitimate reason for absence from the workplace, it is hard to
imagine what would provide such a reason. Viewed in its social context pregnancy
provides a perfectly legitimate health-related reason for not working and as such it
should be compensated by the Safeway plan. In terms of the economic consequences
to the employee resulting from the inability to perform employment duties, pregnancy
is no different from any other health-related reason for absence from the work place.
Furthermore, to not view pregnancy in this way goes against one of the purposes of
anti-discrimination legislation. This purpose . . . is the removal of unfair
disadvantages which have been imposed on individuals or groups in society. Such an
unfair disadvantage may result when the costs of an activity from which all of society
benefits are placed upon a single group of persons. This is the effect of the Safeway
plan. It cannot be disputed that everyone in society benefits from procreation. The
Safeway plan, however, places one of the major costs of procreation entirely upon one
group in society: pregnant women. Thus in distinguishing pregnancy from all other
health-related reasons for not working, the plan imposes unfair disadvantages on
pregnant women ....
Removal of such unfair impositions upon women and other
groups in society is a key purpose of anti-discrimination
legislation. Finding that the
93
Safeway plan is discriminatory furthers that purpose.

As in Morgentaler, where the Court reevaluated the concepts of security of

the person and liberty, and Lavallee, where the Court reevaluated the concept
of justifiable self-defence, the Brooks court reevaluated the concept of
discrimination itself. In its decision, the Court saw equality rights as three
dimensional. The women employees were similar to their male counterparts
in many ways, but very different in another-pregnancy. Under the
traditional similarly situated test, the difference of pregnancy would not have
90. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [ 1986] 2 SCR 573,
603. See also Slaight Communications Inc. v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038, 1078; Hills v Canada (Attorney

General), [1988]
91. [1989]
92. [1979]
93. Brooks,

1 SCR
1 SCR
1 SCR
[1989]

513, 558.
1219.
183.
1 SCR at 1237-38.
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given rise to an equality issue, thus resulting in the perpetuation of inequality
through different and inferior treatment of women. On the other hand, to
conclude that the difference of pregnancy could never justify different
treatment for women would mean the end of maternity benefits and other like
measures and again result in the perpetuation of inequality for women.
It is only when the dimension of disadvantage is added that the solution
becomes evident. It is not biological fiat or "nature" that disadvantages
pregnant women in the workplace, but rather the social and economic
arrangements we have chosen to make, arrangements that tend to force all of
the costs of procreation onto pregnant women. Bearing the major costs of
procreation puts women at a considerable disadvantage in the workforce.
Because social and economic arrangements can be altered, this disadvantage
can be alleviated. Brooks illustrates one situation in which the law does just
that. It should also follow from Brooks that, where measures are positive and
are designed to reduce the costs of procreation for women, a court should not
reject them as discriminatory, since the measures neither worsen nor
perpetuate disadvantage. Thus, as the above examples illustrate, gender
equality in the Canadian context is not limited to same treatment. Rather, the
concept is result-oriented. Further, because of the Andrews and Turpin
approach, which takes into account disadvantage, gender equality is
understood to be aimed at improving the situation of women, consistent with
Canada's international obligations, rather than at assimilating women to male
norms.
IV
CONCLUSION

I have argued that the Canadian Supreme Court's approach to
constitutional equality rights can be seen as three-dimensional, seeing and
taking into account not only comparisons between persons and treatment, but
also the comparative disadvantage experienced by particular groups in
society. This approach is necessary because of the inequality problems
experienced by women, the aged, persons with disabilities, racial minorities,
religious minorities, and other comparable groups. While difficult cases will
arise under any approach, this one has the potential to provide solutions in a
coherent and rational way, and in a way that should not run counter to the
purpose of the legislation.
Although the experience of Supreme Court review of legislation or
governmental activity under section 15 has been limited to three years and
about twenty cases, there has been enough equality jurisprudence under this
section and under human rights legislation to conclude that the Court has
opened up a new path, one that heads in a promising direction. It remains to
be seen whether, after another decade and numerous cases, the jurisprudence
will live up to its initial promise, and whether, if it does, the Canadian
approach to equality rights will influence the approaches taken in other
jurisdictions.

